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Updating international humanitarian law
and the laws of armed conflict for
the wars of the 21st Century
Gregory Rose
Aspects of international humanitarian law (IHL) andthe international law of armed conflict (LOAC)are out-dated because they are ill-adapted to new
battlefields. Some innovation is needed in them to address
thc complexities of the networked insurgencies that we see
today.
War between states has declined in prev alence and
importance relative to armed conflicts across societal groups,
both within states and acro ss nat ional borders. Private
organisations are likely to dominate armed conflicts for the
foreseeable future, including those in the Asia- Pacific and
beyond, where Australian expeditiona ry forces are engaged.
Often called 'non-state actors' in the international legal
parlance, they typically conduct hostilities through irregular
but systematic attacks, including bombings , shootings and
psychological operations. Are these armed conflicts to which
LOAC even applies?
The asymmetrical balance of forces resulting from the
confrontation between states and non-state actors leads
typically to tactics by the latter that include violence
intentionally directed against soft targets such as civilians.
These tactics can be defined as war crimes or terrori sm,
although application of each of these categories is legally
controversial. The crimina lity of the tactics used raises the
need for mechanisms for prosecution of these crimes. Such
mechanisms need to be applicable across a wide runge of
novel armed conflict circumstances and be sufficiently robust
to withstand intensely political scrutiny of their legitimacy.
In addition, the privatisation of American mi litary
operations in Iraq has been extraordinaril y extensive and
responses to allegations made against the conduct ofprivate
security corporations have demonstrated that the framework
for their accountability is poorly developed. To whom are
they liable and should they be covered under status-of-forces
agreements as military auxiliaries? Under what circumstances
might they be regarded as mercenaries?
Confronting sacred taboos
Both IHL and LOAC naturally reflect what we have
learned from the wars of the past. The fresh lessons
of the World War 11 mot ivated a rewrite and further
development of international law, producing the four 1949
Geneva conventions. The mid-20'h-century experience of
decolonisation led to the two 1977 Protocols to the Geneva
Conventions.
Although those treaties and protoco ls are partly based
on enduring moral principles, they are also partly based
on international pol itical processes. Such processes are
reflective of their contemporary attitudes and circumstances
and often articulate fractious compromises . Thus, it should
not be surprising to find that the Geneva convention s and
protoco ls are not fully attuned to the early 21st Century, just
as they could not reasonably be expected to anticipate all the
exigencies of the 22nd Century.
Yet, the new dilemmas of 21st Century war have been
pressing upon legal policy makers with increasing urgency for
over a decade without being addressed. The extraord inarily
important function of IHL and LOAC in civilising armed
conflict has attained a sacred status. The current treaty
instruments have themselves become a holy canon. The
suggestion that aspects ofthem might be inappropriate or ill-
adapted to 21st Century asymmetrical conflict, and that they
need rethinking, attracts consternation and opprobrium among
many expert practitioners. The International Committee of
the Red Cross has stated its position firmly; it sees no need
to revisit the Geneva Convent ions and Protocols .
New conflicts - new moral and
legal dilemmas
Nevertheless, there are endless debates and confusion on
many matters to be found in newspapers, academic journals
and legal and defence circles. These include deciding
whether particular insurgents are or are not terrorists; when
are insurgents to be regarded as combatants and if, when
and how might they retain civilian status; what rights and
protections are they entitled to, and what might the rights
and obligations of state powers be. Such practica l and legal
quandari es demonstrate the uncertainty generated by the
ambiguities and anachroni sms in the Geneva Convent ions
and Protocols. Guantanamo Bay has aptly been called a legal
black hole. The so-called 'War on Terrorism ' gives these
problems profile and urgency.
At the heart of today 's doubts, needs, iniqui ties and
questions are the problems caused by changing battlefield
practices.These include asymmetry offorces, non-distinction .IIIIIIIIl
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between combatants and civilians (especially by terrorists)
and the privatisation or civilianisation by contrac t ofmilitary
support structures and protecti ve security eleme nts. These are
exacerba ted by a fundamental lack of reciprocity between
belligeren t parties, espec ia lly na tion -states bou nd by and
adheri ng to IHL and LOAC, and their terrorist adve rsaries
who do not fee l so bound and who often regard the adherence
by others to IHLand LOAC as an advantage to be rut hless ly
exploited.
Contemporary hosti lit ies led by non-state actors also
are frequently 'internationalised' in that they benefit from
support by foreign governments, whether by means ofarms,
intelligence, finance or refuge. Thus, they are trans-na tional
conflicts that are networked across several co untries but
do not occ ur directly between countries. Debate over the
meaning of Common Article 3 of the Ge neva Conventio ns,
which applies to ar me d co nflict of a ' non-in ternational
character', has ce ntred on whether it properly applies only
to intern al or also to trans-national confl icts. A plurality of
the United States Supreme Co urt considered it to be broad
enough to cover the circumstances of tra ns-nationa l armed
conflict with private organisations (Hamdan v Rumsfe ld).
However, Co mmon Articl e 3 is art iculated in h ighl y
genera lised terms and provides scant legal guidance for state
conduct in address ing the wide variety of circumstances that
need to be covered. Common Article 3 may be suppleme nted
by Article 75 of Additional Protocol I and by Additional
Protocol II , to the ex tent that those provisions have becom e
customary international law, which is uncertain, or to the
extent that those instruments have bee n ratified (eg. Austra lia
has rat ified both, the USA has not).
Jus t as the times change and history moves on, so must the
law. We need to rev iew aspects of the Geneva conventions
and thei r Protocols, discomfort ing a task as it may be, so
as to enable and enforce the rule of law in armed conflict.
To address contemporary battlefie ld rea lity, new questions
need to be elaborated in international law. These primari ly
concern the respective status , rights and responsibilit ies of
statepowersvis-a-vis private actorsthatare notconventional
armed forces, such as insurgents and security corporations.
v
Keeping up with national laws
National legal systems have been far more quick and
ag ile in confronting the new challenges posed by networked
insu rgents us ing terrorist tac tics. Aus tra lia, for example,
like Canada, Fra nce, the United Kingdom and the USA,
has instituted new laws tha t define and crimina lise terrorist
networks, rede fine and modernise the definition of sedition,
exte nd the extra territorial application ofthese crimes, expand
intelligence ga thering powers and pro tec t intellige nce from
disclosure, enab le eme rgency preven tat ive detenti on, create
control orders to restr ict liberty of movement, res tra in some
usual privileges in court cases, and facilitate the mobi lisation
of military forces to assi st the pol ice with dom estic law
enforcement.
Th ese new nation al secur ity laws are fo rg ing a new
legal space between the domestic laws govern ing cr iminal
..... proced ure a nd those g ove rning interna tional arme d
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conflict. Complementary innovation is needed in the more
cumbersom e international lega l sys tem.
Some have suggested that human rights trea ties provide
guidance for IHL and LOAC. On the one hand, it is arguable
that the Geneva Conven tions form a special law (lex specialisi
that displaces the application of human rights norms, such as
the right to life, in the circumstances of arme d confl ict. On
the other hand, the position articulated by United Nations
bodies, including the bench of the International Court of
Justice, opine for the complementary application of human
rights norms but do not prescribe wh ich or how these are to
be implemented during hostilities. Further, it is uncertain
which human rights norms might be considered customary
international law and not all states are bound by all the
relevant provisions.
Sign ificantly, in December 2007 the UK House of Lords
decided that a person 's human rig hts may be in fring ed
law fully in legit imate mil itary operatio ns whe re it is
necessary for imperat ive reasons of sec urity, but that the
human rights concerned are me re ly qualified to the ex tent
necessary, no t displaced. (The case was decided in relation to
mili tary operations by the United Kingdo m in Iraq authori sed
by the Unit ed Nations Sec ur ity Co unc il, and human rig hts
norm s binding on the United Kingdom under the European
Convention on Human Rights iA l-Jeddo v Secretary of
Defence )). How ever, the exten t to which it is necessary to
qualify the application of human rights norms during arme d
conflict remains unclear. There rema ins an immediate need
to ela borate adequate legal standards applicable to non-sta te
actors engaged in hosti lities.
New protocol for a new age of
warfare
A Fourth Protocol to the Geneva Co nve ntions would be
useful. It could fill troubling gaps in the Conventions, and
fix some of the problems of the First Protocol. In particular,
it might clarify in what circumstances targeted attacks on
insurgents who use terrorist tactics are to be characterised
as combat measures in an armed conflict or as extrajudicial
assassinations within statejurisdiction.
A Fourth Protocol might also address some particu larly
vexing dilemmas arising from recent intern ati onal armed
conflicts :
• W hat is th e le gal s ig n ifica nce of t ran s- nat iona l
circumstances in a confl ict w ith pr ivate (non-s tate)
actors?
• When captured alive, how are private actors to be treated,
especially iflon g-term detenti on of terror ist belligerents
is involved to prevent them rene wing their belligerency
(as it is fo r pr ison ers-of- war under the Third Geneva
Convention)?
• When and how are such detained non -state actors to be
released?
• What is the consequence of their non- enemy natio nality,
parti cularly if the armed conflict in question is a trans-
national but not an inter-state one?
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• What is the proper method of trial for their crim es against
IHL?
• Which of the obligations of a sta te power are unilateral
and which reciprocal?
• In what circumstance s are the personnel of a contract ed
private security company entitled to civilian protections
or to be treated as combatants?
• What obligat ions do they owe to whom?
• In cases of negligence or of criminal conduct, to who m
are they liable?
• By what process should they be held acco untable?
The USA has been the main country to begin formulat ing
a set of internationally applicable rules that respond to the
new circumstances of armed conflict. Its efforts to devise a
trial system by military commission have fumbled thro ugh a
thicket of domestic and internat iona l objections. Actions of
the USA in the Middle East, and in Guantanamo Bay, as we ll
as the practice of extraordin ary rendition in Central Europe
and Central As ia, have caused controversy. Allegations
concerning war crimes by the USA and its allies thrive
in the current uncerta inty concerning the app licati on of
the laws of armed confl ict to trans-national terrori sm and
insurgency. That the US's terrorist adversaries resolutely
refuse to comply with IHL in their execution of attacks is
too often ignored or glossed ove r in international discussions
of the legal frameworks invo lved. Highly politicised war
crimes indictments against other political figures and military
personnel also have been launched in countries including
Belgium, France, New Zea land and the UK.
Measures taken by the United States administrat ion and
courts include:
• de fin ing a cl ass of co mbatants not en ti tled to the
prot ections of the Third Geneva Convention;
• defining the responsibi lities of the deta ining power under
Common Article 3 of all four Geneva Convention;
• defini ng armed confl ict by them, whe re it involves
terrorism, as a crime; and
• devising a trial syste m by military commission for those
to be charged with war crimes, crimes against the laws
of war or serious criminal offences.
Moral as well as legal obligation
In December 2007, the LegalAdvi ser to the US Secretary
of Stat e, John B. Bellinger III, in an address at Ox ford
University, called for scholarly debate to clarify and elaborate
the rule of law in relation to detentions of private persons
engaged in trans-national terrori st activities. Similarly, the
Foreign Affairs Committee of the House of Com mons in
the United Kingdom has called for updating of the Geneva
Conventions. Furthe r research and conceptual work is also
needed to elaborate rules for the civil and criminal liabil ity
of private security corporations that a state contracts to
provide services in the fie ld. The process of international
law forma tion is diffuse and the time is ripe to deepen and
widen the discourse on this topic.
Unfo rtunately, there has been little di scourse yet in
academi a on how new legal initi atives might clarify and
elaborate the status of non-state actors . While the political
sen sit ivit y of these issues might be expecte d to inh ibit
governme ntal leadership in a divisive global debate over
innovative standards, it is concerning that acad emic debate
has also been sparse. Ofcourse, the same political sensibilities
and reticence predom inate in academe but it is remarkable
that, over seven years after the I I September 200 I attacks
and the launch of the 'war on terrorism', the issues remain
to be syste matically explored.
Austral ia has much to contribute in this field and a timely
opportu nity to do so. It is appropriate that Australia, as a
member of the ' coalition of the willing' in Iraq, the NATO-
led Internationa l Security Assistance Force in Afghanistan
and the International Security Force in East Timor, consider
its di rect an d regiona l interes ts in the development of
norms related to insurgents and private military companies .
Throughout As ia, state military and police forces are also
both being engaged to combat the overlapping phenome na
of networked insurgency and tran snat ional crime.
Although the USA has gone it alone to create a legal
system to addre ss its trans-natio nal armed conflict with
private parti es, other insurge nts or terrorists and other states
are engaged in com parable conflicts. The examples of anned
conflicts with insurgent groups in India, Indonesia, Paki stan,
the Philippines, Sri Lanka and Thailand come readily to mind.
The time has come for international lawyers in government
and acad emia to upd ate the intern ational laws of armed
conflict. Although it is eas ier to sit back and watch the USA
shoulder the responsibility oflegal innovation, and the risk
of opprobrium for blaspheming apparent holy canon, that
path will not lead to an optimal outcome for Australian and
other national interests.
It will instea d result in the much slower development of
new customary legal practices, greater uncertainty as to what
they are, and a lesser role for other interested countries in
crafting outcomes that are appropriate to their specific need s
and capabilities. And it is cowardly to leave such matters up
to the Am ericans.
If Australian forces in Afghanistan capture in battle a
private combatant who is a citizen of a friend ly count ry, say
Noordin Mohammed Top, how should we treat him and under
what law? Next time an Austra lian ally captures a new David
Hicks on a new battlefield, what shou ld we expect? Unless
we are willing to devise a clearer international law for such
situations, we can have no fair expectations.•
Asso ciate Professor Gregory Rose teaches international
criminal law in the Faculty of Law at the University of
Wollongong. This article has been peer-reviewed bef ore
publication.
